To the Brink: Indian Decision-Making and the 2001-2002 Standoff

Reports of Note

This report examines the 2001-2002 standoff between India and Pakistan that followed a December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by terrorists operating out of Pakistan.The 10-month confrontation occurred less than four years after India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear weapon tests and was the largest military mobilization since World War II. Stolar explores the Indian decision-making process in an attempt to understand how and why India's leaders pursued the strategy they did. His analysis is based on interviews with two former members of India's Cabinet Committee on Security, as well as other senior Indian national security officials.

Stolar ends his report by drawing four conclusions. First, there are limits to traditional nuclear deterrence theory. Second, a limited war between nuclear states entails substantial risks of escalation, and leaders must factor these risks before carrying out a limited military action. Third, national leaders must convey information to a myriad of domestic and international audiences during a crisis, a task both essential and extraordinarily challenging. Finally, the study illustrates the challenges of interagency coordination during crises and the importance of overcoming such challenges.

[Author Affiliation]

By Alex Stolar, The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2008.